Evaluating Economic Reforms in Syria: Final Report for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) by Tilman Brück et al.





For the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
Berlin,  2007
DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt
35 
















© DIW Berlin, 2007 
DIW Berlin 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
Mohrenstraße 58
10117 Berlin 
Tel. +49 (30) 897 89-0 





ISSN       1614-6921 
 
Alle Rechte vorbehalten. 
Abdruck oder vergleichbare 
Verwendung von Arbeiten 
des DIW Berlin ist auch in 



























Berlin, December 2007 
 
 
*  DIW Berlin, Department of International Economics. tbruck@diw.de 
**  DIW Berlin, Department of International Economics. cbinzel@diw.de 
***  DIW Econ GmbH. lhandrich@diw.de
  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt 35 
Executive Summary 
Executive Summary 
Aims and Approach 
This report provides an overview of Syria’s economic reform process and the challenges 
facing the Syrian economy. It is based on a fact finding mission in May 2007 by researchers 
of the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW Berlin) during which a series of 
interviews were conducted with various Syrian government as well as non-government 
representatives. These interviews have been complemented with a review of most recent 
reports and the literature of stabilisation and structural reform processes in developing 
countries, Eastern Europe and the Newly Industrialising countries of South East Asia. In 
contrast to most other economic reports on Syria, this report attempts not merely to evaluate 
the current state of reforms but to analyse the underlying institutional and systemic 
barriers that could hinder future progress. 
Key Findings 
As the report shows, Syria has made great strides towards agreeing and implementing 
economic reforms. Nonetheless, the Syrian economy faces three major challenges: 
1.  to achieve the shift from an oil-exporting economy towards a net oil importer; 
2.  to manage the transition from a socialist planned economy towards a liberalised 
social market economy; and 
3.  to reduce poverty and enhance human development through targeted interventions 
which ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth and equal economic opportunities 
for wealth creation across all segments of the Syrian society. 
Even though poverty in Syria decreased in recent years, 30.1 % of Syrians live in poverty 
(using the upper bound of the poverty line taking into account actual consumption patterns of 
the poor). 
Declining oil revenues which in the past constituted major government revenue are placing a 
severe constraint on the public budget balance. Deducting oil revenues reveals a large budget 
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deficit which indicates the serious challenge to macro-economic stability if oil revenues cease 
without serious adjustment of Syria’s public revenue and expenditure structure. 
According to the findings of the mission, the following factors constitute the main problem 
for the imbalance between public expenditure and non-oil revenues: 
1.  Subsidies -especially energy subsidies-, drain public resources. 
2.  The public sector as administrative body is too large and consequently inefficient. 
3.  Non-oil revenues are small, due to a malfunctioning taxation system. 
4.  The remaining scarce public resources are allocated inefficiently, often favouring 
non-productive sectors rather than focusing investment on those sectors which will 
render the highest economic and social returns. 
At the same time, several major obstacles hinder the transition of the Syrian economy into a 
market economy: 
1.  Here the analysis points specifically to the challenge of state-owned enterprises and 
the taboo to phase out soft-budget constraints not to mention the impossibility of 
their privatisation. 
2.  At the same time, increased private sector involvement is impeded through a sub-
optimal business environment which creates disincentives to invest. Costs of doing 
business remain high, due to the prevalence of a number of serious non-tariff barriers 
but especially due to the high risks to investment arising from arbitrary if at all 
existing, enforcement of laws. 
3.  Furthermore, labour productivity lags far behind international standards, due to 
an insufficiently skilled labour force, thin physical and technological infrastructure 
and limited improvements in production processes. 
4.  A further important issue is the economic integration of Iraqis in Syria which are in 
part seen as a short-term issue and as a burden in some sectors of the economy - 
despite the demand impetus that the Iraqis induce. This short term perspective causes 
lost economic opportunities. Furthermore, the incomplete integration of the Iraqis 
could in the medium to long term lead to social discontent and political backlashes. 
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At a more cross cutting level, varying perceptions about the credibility as well as 
sustainability of the Syrian reform process create further disincentives to the economic 
reform process. In this respect, key variables are not only the degree to which economic 
reforms are implemented but the overall reform environment which is determined not just by 
economic but also political variables. The isolated approach with which the Syrian 
government pursues its economic reform process may contribute to doubts against the 
credibility and sustainability of the reform process. 
Syrian officials appear to recognise many of these shortcomings, yet, several obstacles 
impede the improvement of the reform process: 
1.  Especially mid-level civil servants lack the capacity if not the willingness to 
implement often complex reforms that can undermine their own job security and 
social position. 
2.  Lack of capacity is aggravated through limited availability of data and thus 
information on the progress and shortcomings of the reform process. 
3.  There is a lack of a strategic involvement of donors in the reform process. Although 
the role of donors may be contested, they do have a role to play in vital activities (e.g. 
data collection and M&E) for which the Syrian budget does not suffice. 
Recommendations 
Building on the key findings derived from the interviews and the available literature, the 
mission proposes the following recommendations to the Syrian government: 
1. To address the challenge of macro-economic stabilisation, the government should focus on 
reducing the unsustainable budget deficit through: 
•  Aiming to phase out subsidies fully (while in parallel building up a less costly and 
more effective social safety net to protect the poorest of the poor). The overall aim of 
the changes should be relief of the fiscal deficit and more effective poverty alleviation. 
•  Further limiting recruitment in the public sector. 
•  Focusing on enhancing the efficiency of non-oil revenue collection, especially through 
improving the current tax administration; yet without creating disincentives to the 
currently large informal sector to enter the formal economy. 
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•  Allocating scarce public finances more effectively, i.e. into the economically most 
productive sectors. 
 
2. To foster structural reform and the private sector supply response through: 
•  Exposing State owned enterprises to competition thus inducing efficient (financial) 
management by phasing out currently prevailing soft-budget constraints. 
•  Rather than training more entrepreneurs, creating a more conducive business 
environment for existing entrepreneurs by reducing „costs of doing business” 
especially through ending non-tariff barriers and strengthening the rule of law. 
•  Maximising the economic benefits that refugees can provide to the Syrian economy. 
 
3. To enhance the credibility and thus sustainability of the reform process through: 
•  Recognising that economic sustainability is determined by non-economic factors such 
as internal and external political stability and that the credibility of economic reforms 
cannot be detached from internal and external political processes. 
•  Embracing the involvement of donors in providing technical and financial capacity to 
support the reform process. 
 
Likewise, the mission proposes the following recommendations to the international 
community: 
1. To address the challenge of macro-economic stabilisation, donors could: 
•  Provide financial assistance and expertise in activities critical to the success of the 
reform process, which surpass the Syrian budget limitations (e.g. data collection). 
 
2. To foster structural reform and the private sector supply response through: 
•  Supporting Syria’s regional and international economic integration e.g. by fostering 
bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements. 
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•  Supporting the improvement of internal political constraints, specifically those relating 
to enforcement of the rule of law. 
•  Supporting human capital accumulation, importantly not with a short term focus on 
entrepreneurial training but rather through a comprehensive improvement of the 
quality and accessibility of education across all levels. 
•  Supporting the integration of refugees into economic processes. 
•  Building Syrian analytical capacity through supporting data collection (Panel and 
household data) and strengthening research institutes such as the National Planning 
Institute (NIP) to provide analysis and policy advice building on and extending model 
experiences such as the National Agricultural Policy Centre (NAPC). 
 
3. To enhance the credibility and thus sustainability of the reform process through: 
•  Supporting human capital development as mentioned above. 
•  Recognising the internal political difficulties to implement specific steps of the reform 
process and supporting the search for adequate solutions to overcome internal political 
constraints to the reform process. 
•  Supporting the resolution of external political constraints that jeopardise the 
sustainability and credibility of the reform process. 
  VDIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt 35 
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Since the succession of Bashar al-Asad in 2000, the Syrian government has embarked on a 
course of economic reform to restructure its economy from a socialist planned into a social 
market economy while at the same time alleviating poverty and promoting human 
development. The 10
th Five Year Plan (thereafter denoted 10
th FYP) sets out the fundamental 
priorities on which its economic reform programme is based. These stress the need to place 
the economy on sound fundamentals, revising and reforming macroeconomic policies, linking 
economic growth to employment and poverty alleviation, introducing a new economic culture 
and revising social services. Given that these reforms can only be implemented in the long 
term, the 10
th FYP is embedded in a longer term strategy to enhance the efficiency and equity 
of resource allocation. To achieve its goals, the Syrian government has been introducing 
stabilising measures and structural reforms, which touch on all aspects of the economy, 
including the adjustment of fiscal policy, changes to monetary and exchange rate policies, 
trade and financial liberalisation, and the opening of the previously state dominated 
productive sectors to the private sector. So far, most emphasis has been has placed on 
stabilisation policies through adjustments to fiscal policy focusing on reducing the budget 
deficit. 
1.2 Aim  and  Approach 
This report provides an overview and an assessment of the current reform process in Syria. 
Importantly, this report seeks not just to document the progress and limitations of the Syrian 
reforms but also to examine the underlying barriers to the reform process incorporating 
lessons learned from the experiences of stabilisation and structural reform programmes in 
Latin America and Africa as well as the example of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) 
in Asia. It is necessary to recognise that the main lesson that has been drawn across the 
various case studies and examples is that there is no blueprint to a reform programme (World 
Bank 1993). In other words, different economic, political, social and historic contexts as well 
as different natural and human capital endowments imply that each country faces its own very 
individual reform path. Nevertheless, across the various case studies certain maxims can be 
derived that can serve as guiding principles. 
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The analysis is based on a series of interviews conducted by researchers of the German 
Institute of Economic Research (DIW Berlin) with various Syrian government representatives 
as well as non-government analysts during a fact-finding mission from 18 to 25 May 2007 
(see Table 1 in the Annex for a list of interviews). The report makes a unique contribution to 
the literature on Syria and the Arab economies by emphasising the political economy aspects 
of the reform process, rather than the economic indicators themselves. Furthermore, the report 
differentiates itself from other critical writings of the Arab economies (such as Noland and 
Pack 2007) by emphasising the serious budgetary implications of declining oil revenues, 
which differentiate the situation of Syria from countries with no or larger oil reserves, like 
Jordan or the Gulf states, respectively. Finally, the report does account for the critical “soft 
issues” involved in the reform process. However, the report emphasises issues like credibility 
and commitment rather than issues like religion. In common with other works on the region 
the report also stresses the critical role of educating the rapidly growing work force (including 
refugees and other non-nationals). 
1.3 Main  Findings 
The Syrian economy faces three major challenges: 
1.  To achieve the shift from an oil-exporting economy towards a net oil importer; 
2.  to manage the transition from a socialist planned economy towards a liberalised social 
market economy; and 
3.  to reduce poverty and enhance human development through targeted interventions 
which ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth and equal economic 
opportunities for wealth creation across all segments of the Syrian society. 
Even though poverty in Syria decreased in recent years, 30.1 % of Syrians live in poverty 
(using the upper bound of the poverty line taking into account actual consumption patterns of 
the poor). 
Declining oil revenues which in the past constituted major government revenue are placing a 
severe constraint on the public budget balance. Deducting oil revenues reveals a large budget 
deficit which indicates the serious challenge to macro-economic stability if oil revenues cease 
without serious adjustment of Syria’s public revenue and expenditure structure. 
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According to the findings of the mission, the following factors constitute the main problem 
for the imbalance between public expenditure and non-oil revenues: 
1.  Subsidies -especially energy subsidies- drain public resources. 
2.  The public sector as administrative body is too large and consequently inefficient. 
3.  Non-oil revenues are small, due to a malfunctioning taxation system. 
4.  The remaining scarce public resources are allocated inefficiently, often favouring non-
productive sectors rather than focusing investment on those sectors which will render 
the highest economic and social returns. 
At the same time, several major obstacles hinder the transition of the Syrian economy into a 
market economy.  
1.  Here the analysis points specifically to the challenge of state-owned enterprises and 
the taboo to phase out soft-budget constraints not to mention the impossibility of their 
privatisation. 
2.  At the same time, increased private sector involvement is impeded through a sub-
optimal business environment which creates disincentives to invest. Costs of doing 
business remain high, due to the prevalence of a number of serious non-tariff barriers 
but especially due to the high risks to investment arising from arbitrary if at all 
existing, enforcement of laws. 
3.  Furthermore, labour productivity lags far behind international standards, due to an 
insufficiently skilled labour force, thin physical and technological infrastructure and 
limited improvements in production processes. 
4.  A further important issue is the economic integration of Iraqis in Syria which are in 
part seen as a short-term issue and as a burden in some sectors of the economy - 
despite the demand impetus that the Iraqis induce. This short term perspective causes 
lost economic opportunities. Furthermore, the incomplete integration of the Iraqis 
could in the medium to long term lead to social discontent and political backlashes. 
At a more cross-cutting level, varying perceptions about the credibility as well as 
sustainability of the Syrian reform process create further disincentives to economic agents. In 
this respect, key variables are not only the degree to which economic reforms are 
implemented but the overall reform environment which is determined not just by economic 
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but also political variables. The isolated approach with which the Syrian government pursues 
its economic reform process may contribute to doubts against the credibility and sustainability 
of the reform process. 
Syrian officials appear to recognise many of these shortcomings, yet, several obstacles 
impede the improvement of the reform process:  
1.  Especially mid-level civil servants lack the capacity if not the willingness to 
implement often complex reforms that can undermine their own job security and 
social position. 
2.  Lack of capacity is aggravated through limited availability of data and thus 
information on the progress and shortcomings of the reform process. 
3.  There is a lack of a strategic involvement of donors in the reform process. Although 
the role of donors may be contested, they do have a role to play in vital activities (e.g. 
data collection and M&E) for which the Syrian budget does not suffice. 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
the macro-economic situation of Syria. Section 3 sheds light on the state of Syria’s reform 
process. Section 4 discusses underlying obstacles that may hinder the progress of reform as 
required. Section 5 concludes and presents the main policy recommendations. 
2  The Challenges Facing Syria 
The Syrian economy faces three major challenges: 
•  to achieve the shift from an oil-exporting economy towards a net oil importer; 
•  to manage the transition from a socialist planned economy towards a liberalised social 
market economy; and 
•  to reduce poverty and enhance human development through targeted interventions 
which ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth and equal economic 
opportunities for wealth creation across all segments of the Syrian society. 
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2.1  Shifting from Oil Exporter to Net Oil Importer 
The Syrian economy owes its relative macro-economic stability mainly to its oil production 
and exports. Yet, oil reserves are dwindling rapidly signified. In consequence, declining 
production and exports are already negatively impacting on key macroeconomic variables. 
While Syrian non-oil GDP growth has been estimated at 6-7 % in 2006 - actual overall GDP 
growth amounts only to 4.3 % when making deductions for the decrease in oil based GDP 
(IMF 2007a). Even though Syria has recorded a trade surplus between 2001 and 2005, this 
surplus is still largely due to oil exports (10
th FYP Chapter 2:7). Last but not least, declining 
oil revenues have specifically impacted on public budget balance resulting in an overall 
budget deficit of 5.7 % of GDP in 2006. Yet, deducting oil revenues, the non-oil budget 
deficit amounted to 10.2 % (2006) (IMF 2007a). In addition, increases in demand for energy 
in the future could increase the net oil imports to reach about 7-8 % of GDP further eroding 
the budget balance. 
2.2  Transition from Centrally Planned to a Social Market Economy 
Since the year 2000, the Syrian government has embarked on an economic reform programme 
to transform the socialist planned economy into a social market economy (Thießen and 
Handrich 2006). This transition is outlined in Syria’s 10
th FYP for the years 2006 to 2010. 
Even though the economy has experienced a revival since the year 2000, this growth has been 
primarily based on increases in consumption (not least thanks to the influx of Iraqi refugees) 
and primary exports, while there is little actual value added within the Syrian economy (IMF 
2007a). Private sector investment has responded positively to the liberalisation of the 
economy, yet, so far no real „take-off” has been recorded (IMF 2007a). 
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Figure 1:  
Total Factor Productivity Gaps: All Industrial Sectors 
 
Source: World Bank (2005: i). 
 
The growth in labour productivity has at best sharply decreased; at worst labour productivity 
has in fact fallen (ERF 2006). According to the 10
th FYP the decline in labour productivity 
was particularly severe in the construction and the services sectors while it also fell in the 
agricultural and in the transport sectors (10
th FYP, Chapter 2:6). It has been estimated that 
overall unit labour productivity in the period 1997 to 2002 experienced a negative average 
annual growth rate of -1% (ERF 2006: 9). Consequently, in comparison to international 
standards, Syria’s total factor productivity lags behind many countries (World Bank 2005: i). 
Expressed as Factor Productivity Gap, Figure 1 shows the extent of Syria’s comparative 
disadvantage. 
2.3  The Challenge of Widespread Poverty 
Syria currently scores 0.724 in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2007). The absolute 
value of the Index improved steadily over time from 0.547 in 1975 to 0.628 in 1985 and 0.676 
in 1995. However, the current rank of 108 (out of 177 countries) is lower than all other 
Middle Eastern countries apart from Egypt, which ranks 111. Even though poverty in Syria 
decreased in recent years, 30.1 % of Syrians live in poverty (using the upper bound of the 
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poverty line taking into account actual consumption patterns of the poor). In addition, the 
large influx or refugees from Iraq, which is not accounted for in official statistics, is 
aggravating the pressures on the social system. 
Altogether, this creates challenging conditions for the implementation of economic reforms. 
In particular, the Syrian government is acutely aware of the danger of reforms having a 
negative impact on mean income and the distribution of income across the whole population 
and across distinct population groups (such as urban versus rural residents or employees in 
different economic sectors) in the short, medium and long terms. These considerations will 
hence complicate the „internal” constraints that the Syrian economic reforms have to face (as 
will be discussed below). 
3  The Reform Agenda in Syria 
As the experiences from stabilisation programmes of Africa, Latin America and Asia show, 
implementation of these tasks especially coupled with a structural reform programme is 
highly complex not least as stabilisation and structural reform are tightly interlinked and 
mutually reinforce or undermine their respective success. On the one hand, even though 
knowledge on sequencing of reforms is scant, the literature suggests that stabilisation is a 
necessary precondition for successful structural reform. Private sector investment is 
dependent on certainty about key macro-economic fundamentals, particularly price stability. 
Given its relation to inflationary pressures and repercussions on real exchange rates, fiscal 
stability is a key element to signal to investors a stable macro-economic environment (Rodrik 
1990). 
On the other hand, successful macro-economic stabilisation is dependent on the development 
of the private sector, i.e. a supply response to compensate for the reduced public sector 
spending and secure government revenues, employment and investment. At the same time, 
the opening of the economy to the private sector may undermine stabilisation, for example if 
trade tariffs provided significant government revenues or if the liberalisation and subsequent 
rise of a previously repressed interest rate increases the value of government debts. Thus, 
stabilisation and structural reform do not constitute two distinct activities but a continuous 
interrelated process with inherent tensions but also with potentially serious political 
implications. 
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3.1  Fiscal Issues and Subsidies 
3.1.1 Overview 
So far the Syrian government has maintained relative fiscal discipline (IMF 2007a) yet, the 
actual extent of its budget deficit is masked by the still existing oil revenues. While a 
cumulative improvement of 7 percentage points of GDP has decreased the non-oil budget 
deficit over the period 2004-2006, the non-oil budget deficit still amounted to 10.2% of GDP 
in 2006 (IMF 2007a: 6). This compares with an expected budget deficit of 7.5 % for Egypt in 
2007 (IMF 2007b) and estimated budget deficit of 3.75 % for Jordan in 2006 (IMF 2007c). 
On the one hand, this signifies that despite fiscal adjustment public sector expenditure is still 
unsustainably large. On the other hand, it illustrates Syria’s dependence on oil production and 
exports to maintain macro-economic stability. 
Given the drastic reduction of oil reserves and oil exports, there is a strong urgency for 
dramatic fiscal policy changes. In addition, the government will further loose sources of 
income through the liberalisation of trade and the abandonment of customs and tariff duties. 
To ensure continued macro-economic stability, the Syrian government will have to diversify 
its sources of revenues, reduce expenditures and therefore allocate its financial resources more 
efficiently and effectively. More specifically, the Syrian government as outlined in its 10
th 
FYP and reiterated cumulatively in the interviews, needs to tackle the following key problems 
on the expenditure side: 
1.  To abolish quickly explicit and implicit subsidies, which place a heavy burden on the 
public budget, distort prices and induce inefficiencies in the production system; 
2.  To reduce the size of the public sector (which should include restructuring of currently 
state owned enterprises); and 
3.  To revise budget priorities to allocate limited resources more effectively (for example 
away from blanket subsidies towards spending on education). 
Furthermore, these savings should be complemented on the income side: 
4.  With the improvement of non-oil government revenues mainly through enhancing the 
Syrian taxation system. 
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3.1.2  Large subsidies and huge price distortions 
The most costly subsidies that drain the Syrian government finances are implicit energy 
subsidies. These do not incur an expenditure as such but constitute a loss, as parts of oil and 
gas are not sold internationally at world market prices but in the domestic market at reduced 
prices. This problem is further aggravated since Syria switched from a net oil exporter to a net 
oil importer position. An especially heavy burden on the state budget and the economy is the 
subsidization of diesel fuel. Because of limited domestic refining capacities, Syria imports 
significant amounts of diesel fuel, which is domestically sold at prices several times below the 
import price and the price level in neighbouring countries. This price distortion induces an 
enormous waste of diesel and the smuggling of significant quantities into neighbouring states. 
Until now the government has not received any revenues from its natural gas as this is sold to 
final consumers and power plants at cost prices (Garzaldeen et al. 2006). (Note that in Syria 
domestic gas is sold at US Dollar 65 per metric ton.) Together with explicit subsidies (for 
agricultural products, transfers for water and electricity), these subsidies amounted to 11.6 % 
of GDP in 2003, and 14.7 % of GDP in 2004 and they have been rising since (IMF 2007a). 
Moreover, particularly energy subsidies are not only costly, but also inequitable as richer 
households consume more and therefore take the greatest gain from the subsidies, a fact 
which has been recognised by technical experts as well as Syrian government officials 
(Interview 6; Interview 10). 
Given their significance for public expenditure, the rapid phasing out of these subsidies 
should be highest priority on the reform agenda. Indeed, addressing energy subsidies will 
form one of the corner stones of the reform process from 2007 onwards (Interview 6, 10
th 
FYP). At the same time, the government recognises the political, social and economic 
difficulties entailed in phasing out subsidies. Most significantly, agriculture which is 
contributing a significant share to GDP (around 30 %) and forms the most important sector 
for the poor, is largely dependent on fuel subsidies (World Bank 2005). Phasing out subsidies 
may contribute to reducing inefficient economic activities. However, interview partners 
expressed the belief that the government fears that reducing subsidies will also significantly 
affect sources of rural income and employment and reduce the purchasing power of economic 
agents across the country. 
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Consequently, the government appears to have opted to phase out subsidies gradually but also 
to accompany their reduction with measures to ease the burden especially on the poor 
(Interview 6; Interview 10; Interview 21). In addition, current plans entail setting up a Social 
Welfare Fund at the beginning of 2008, which aims to directly support the poor and thus to 
mitigate the adverse effects of price increases. Ultimately, this is seen by the government as 
contributing not only to save resources but also to redistribute financial resources more 
efficiently and equitably, as direct support is provided to the poor, rather than to wealth 
related consumption. 
However, with strong rent seeking groups active in the economy and with a low degree of 
managerial capacity in the design and implementation of such a scheme (both revealed by our 
interview partners), it is not unlikely that this new form of subsidy may be controlled and 
benefiting in the end not the originally intended target groups but better off, regime-
supporting groups. The worst outcome from a social planning perspective may hence be the 
introduction of another inefficient and costly subsidy scheme without the abolition of the 
inefficient and costly subsidy scheme it was meant to replace. It is necessary for the 
government to outline a positive programme of economic reforms which will entail actual or 
expected benefits to enough sections of the population that entrenched opposition to reforms 
will be weakened. 
3.1.3  The oversized public sector 
The size of the public sector places another heavy burden on public finances. There are two 
distinct elements which need to be addressed: first, the size and organisation of the public 
sector as an administrative body, and second, the costs and risks that state owned enterprises 
pose. 
With respect to the first, the public sector has and still is functioning as pool absorbing 
surplus labour irrespective of actual needs and uses. In 2003, the public sector accounted for 
28 % of employment (Huitfeldt and Kabbani 2006). In addition to the large size of the public 
sector, payment structures and other benefits are relatively high in comparison to workload 
and skill level. Further, public sector employees just benefited from two 20 % wage increases 
in 2002 and 2004, and an increase in 15 % of retirement benefits (ERF 2006). Still, earnings 
are not sufficient to cover living expenses with the consequence that many public sector 
employees take on second employment. Limiting the recruitment of civil servants is not only 
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necessary to reduce public expenditures but also to force new entrants in the labour market to 
seek employment with the private sector. Currently especially first entrants into the labour 
market reject private employment in favour of public sector employment given greater 
security and benefits derived from the latter (Interview 14; Interview 18; Interview 19; 
Interview 42). 
Yet, downsizing the public sector implies foregoing its role as safety net of surplus labour 
with the likely consequence to increase unemployment at least temporarily until the private 
sector is able to provide sufficient employment opportunities. Especially low qualified public 
sector workers and/or those employees who have been hired not based on merit but rather 
based on connections could face difficulties in a competitive labour market. Our interviews 
revealed that the government recognises the need to reduce the size of public sector 
employment, but mainly stresses the difficulty to implement this policy. Possible solutions 
that were mentioned in an interview with the Institute for National Institute for Public 
Administration suggested to either provide early retirement or re-education schemes for civil 
servants made redundant (Interviews 14; Interview 15). The first is recognised to be only a 
theoretical option given the current rate of pension provisions of the public sector (Interviews 
14; Interview 15). Thus, this unresolved policy issue could create a major obstacle to 
downsizing the public sector, even more so considering that it is civil servants who will be 
managing and implementing a reform programme which ultimately threatens their own 
position as well as the position of friends and relatives. 
The above problem becomes even more urgent, considering that besides reducing the size of 
the public sector, Syria’s public sector needs to enhance the efficiency of its bureaucratic 
apparatus. Inefficiencies are incurred not only through the size of the sector but also through 
the lack of qualified staff. The lack of skills derives mainly from the public sector recruitment 
structure which in the past had been based more on personal relations and linkages rather than 
on actual qualifications (Huitfeldt and Kabbani 2006). If the Syrian government does not want 
to increase its public sector even further, it needs to free space for better qualified staff at least 
in the short run, again a task with large political implications. 
Second, state owned enterprises are a major drain on public finances. Given large 
inefficiencies and mismanagement of these enterprises, significant parts of the state budget 
are spent to prevent their bankruptcy. In 2003, the net budgetary contribution to public 
enterprises amounted to 14.5 % of budgetary expenditures (ERF 2006). Consequently, a 
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wholesome public enterprise reform would require not only enhancing efficiency but also to 
remove their monopoly power and expose them to competition, solve their arrears and 
subsequently prevent any further bad loans. There are some initial attempts to restructure 
public enterprises to function under a market economy without negatively impacting on 
employment (Interview 29). Nevertheless, the government currently attaches greater weight to 
the protection of employment than efficiency or the budget balance. Consequently, the more 
radical but consistent and inevitable step towards privatisation is still a political taboo 
preventing to solve one of the ultimate root causes of economic inefficiency in Syria. 
3.1.4 Inefficient  budget  spending 
Given tighter budget constraints, a more economically efficient but also a more productive 
budget allocation is a key to maximising growth. In other words, public spending should 
account explicitly for market incentives, prices and real growth potentials. Between 1999 and 
2003, more than half of the budget was spent on military defence, civilian wages, subsidies 
and price transfers. The 10
th FYP foresees to restructure its budget allocations focusing on 
increasing investments in infrastructure as well as human development and poverty reduction: 
“Due to the great importance of the service sector (education and health) in re-fixing 
the imbalance in regional development and enhancing human development especially 
in underdeveloped regions, 28% of total government investment spending will be 
channelled into these two areas [education and health]” in the course of the 10
th FYP 
(10th FYP, Chapter 4: 4-5). 
This adjustment as well as the shift in responsibility of the state providing public goods and 
social services was reiterated in the interviews (Interview 6; Interview 30; Interview 31). 
Further, in an interview with Syria Today, the Deputy Prime Minister al Dardari announced 
planned infrastructure investments of US Dollar 25 billion (Syria Today July 2007). Given the 
precarious budgetary situation of the government, such promises seem overtly optimistic. 
3.1.5  Underdeveloped non-oil budget revenues 
Public revenues depended to almost 50 % on oil related proceeds between 1999 to 2003. In 
contrast, non-oil tax revenues and non-oil non tax revenues amounted to 36 % and 15 %, 
respectively, in the same period. The small share of non-oil tax revenues is due to the 
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stagnation of non-oil industries but also due to far reaching tax exemptions as well as 
significant tax evasion (ERF 2006). 
Consequently, the Syrian government is placing large emphasis on improving its taxation 
system as an important source of government revenues. In this respect, it has reformed the tax 
system as well as the tax administration (IMF 2007a). With respect to the first, it has placed 
large emphasis to simplify and reduce tax rates while at the same time increasing the width of 
the tax base. The latter effect has successfully compensated the first so that in total tax 
revenues have been increased (IMF 2007a), which is an encouraging sign (though also no 
solution yet to the challenge of the budget deficit). Further, the Syrian government is 
introducing a VAT system, which has already been institutionalised in the tourism and 
restaurant sectors (with a VAT-rate of 11 %) and should be levied on further sectors 
(Interview 4; Interview 5). However, the improvements especially of tax administration 
remain contested. In part, the World Bank claims that the Syrian tax administration is riddled 
by corrupt practices and discretionary actions by tax agents which render the reduced 
corporate tax rates de facto ineffective and thus creates major disincentives to declare taxable 
revenues (World Bank 2005). 
In addition, the significant size of the shadow economy is undermining tax collection with the 
consequence that total tax revenues only represent 8.5 % of GDP (10.5 % if foreign taxes are 
considered) (10
th FYP, Chapter 5:4). In this respect the 10
th FYP proposes to enhance tax 
efficiency through better controlling and punishing tax evasion. These measures have to be 
carefully applied as not to create a disincentive for the informal private sector to enter the 
formal economy. It is important to bear in mind for the government that the shadow economy 
may be driven large parts of the Syrian private sector – and that it is important to encourage 
all forms of legal private sector activity. The policy challenge is to set tax rates and to 
administer taxes in a way it all most or all activities can be conducted openly and legally, thus 
maximising the tax base. For the time being, the opaque tax administration practices 
mentioned appear to pose a severe disincentive for currently informal businesses to enter the 
formal economy (World Bank 2005). Yet, this problem does not seem to have been 
recognised sufficiently by the Syrian government or our other Syrian interview partners, who 
almost all failed to discuss this important topic. 
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3.1.6 Assessment 
If any lessons can be drawn from the varying experiences of stabilisation and reform across 
different countries, it is that these inherent tensions between demand and supply measures 
require time and resources invested effectively across prioritised activities of a coherent 
strategy (Killick and Stevens 1991, Rodrik 1990, Toye 2000). In this respect, Syria has the 
advantage of not being in a state of economic crisis in contrast to the experiences of for 
example the Eastern European economies. The crisis conditions in which stabilisation had to 
be pursued in these countries did not leave policy makers time to reflect of adequate timing 
and sequencing of the overall reform programme (Killick and Stevens 1991). However, the 
declining oil revenues signal an impending crisis if reforms are not broadened, deepened and 
accelerated. 
Even though the Syrian government has made great advances towards stabilising its economy, 
there are still several challenges that need to be overcome. The government must increase its 
revenues through improved tax administration and collection and it must make credible cuts 
in its expenditures, thus demonstrating to the private sector its commitment to economic 
reforms. 
In this respect, some steps and measures should be absolute priority: 
•  First and foremost, the costly and inequitable Diesel subsidies should be abolished. 
•  Second, all off-budget implicit subsidies should be transformed into on-budget 
explicit subsidies to account for their real cost. 
•  Importantly, where subsidies and similar wide measures are employed to support the 
livelihoods of the poor, these should be abandoned in favour of well targeted effective 
social safety nets which reach the poor rather than subsidise the better off. 
•  It is important to move towards and encourage self-reliance as a new social security 
paradigm. 
•  With respect to the public sector, the size of its administrative body but especially its 
role in the economy should be revised. 
•  New public sector employment should be reduced with immediate effect, and the 
overall downsizing of the public sector should be considered. 
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•  As state owned enterprises and banks are not only a large burden on the budget but 
also a risk due to their inefficiencies and potential default, they should at least be 
restructured to obtain financial autonomy under private sector management, or be 
privatised altogether. 
•  Last but not least, in order to enable accurate monitoring of revenues, expenditures 
and thus the fiscal situation in the country an improvement in data collection and 
administration is of utmost importance. Currently, the available data appears to be 
fragmented at best, thus hindering an accurate analysis of the current situation. 
3.2  The Private Sector Supply Response 
3.2.1  Recent steps to liberalise the private sector 
Besides achieving macro-economic stabilisation, the Syrian government aims to transform its 
socialist planned economy into a social market economy embedded in the international 
market. The case of the East Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs) provides important 
lessons, whose growth in a nutshell was based on: 
•  sound macro-economic policies, 
•  a managed opening of the economy and 
•  maximising dynamic competitiveness through selective policy interventions that 
stimulated technological learning and innovation (Lall 2001). 
While businesses drove innovation and investment, the state supported industrial „winners” 
through selective interventions including human capital formation of the general workforce as 
well as technical experts through investment in basic as well as tertiary education, mild 
financial repression to allow investment and the creation of a business friendly tax 
environment. Importantly, the growth of the NICs rested on a functioning legislative and 
regulatory basis that ensured businesses their returns on investments (World Bank 1993). 
Importantly, the so called „East Asian Miracle” challenged the main consensus that 
liberalisation is a sufficient condition to spur sustainable industrial development as the 
experience of the NICs showed that given market failures selective state intervention is 
necessary (World Bank 1993, UNIDO 2002) although not a panacea if state failure replaces 
market failure (Lall 1995). 
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During the socialist regime, many key activities of the economy had been closed for private 
investment and were entirely in the hands of the public sector. Nevertheless, Syria’s available 
entrepreneurial talent which is recognised internationally (World Bank 2005) appears to have 
flourished even at the peak of socialism, no least in the form of informal businesses 
(Interview 6). However, this has often been at the price of tacit rent-seeking activities 
whereby Alawai patrons protect the investments of Sunni capitalists (Henry and Springborg 
2006: 126). What remains unclear is to what extent Syrians living abroad are willing and able 
to contribute to future investment and growth in Syria. 
Today about 100,000 small and medium firms and a few very large firms constitute the 
„private sector”, which cumulatively have grown to produce 61 % of GDP in 2002 (up from 
40 % of GDP in 1980) and provide significant employment in Syria (World Bank 2005). Most 
industry is based in two centres: Aleppo and Damascus with Homs, Hama and Latakia 
forming important secondary locations for private sector development (World Bank 2005). 
Within the context of the reform programme, the government recently embarked on a suite of 
activities to liberalise the economy not only internally but also externally to enable and 
stimulate private sector investment. These reforms include the liberalisation of trade and 
investment as well as the liberalisation of the financial sector to enhance financial 
intermediation and the availability of capital. However, these reforms are not yet old enough 
to track their impact in the real economy. The main function of the reforms to date have been 
as a signal that the Syrian government is considering a change in its economic policy. 
The Syrian government has placed particular emphasis on opening the economy to foreign 
trade within and beyond the region to enable the import of necessary factor inputs, expose 
local producers to international competition but also to expand the market for an increased 
range of Syrian products. This is an important step towards a more liberalised economy 
considering that until recently the Syrian government maintained a strong self-reliance 
mentality (see the section on internal and external constraints below). Until 1990 only the 
public sector was allowed to trade. Since the year 1990, international trade has been 
liberalised and opened for the private sector - albeit slowly in order to avoid negative 
consequences. Hand in hand with this, the number of goods prohibited to trade which initially 
included 23,000 items has been reduced drastically to include a small list of goods related to 
health, security and cultural goods (Interview 32). The average tariff rate has been reduced 
from 20 % to 14.5 %, the maximum rate has been decreased from 225 % to 60 % and customs 
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procedures have been simplified (IMF 2007a). Apart from tariff reductions and customs 
simplifications Syria has in 2005 joined the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) 
and implemented in 2007 a Free Trade Agreement with Turkey. Currently the Syrian 
government has embarked on trade negotiations with Russia, Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran 
amongst others (Interview 11). 
The association agreement with the EU that the Syrian government had negotiated was put on 
hold by the EU in 2004, yet a visit by Javier Solana in March 2007 has raised hopes that 
negotiations might be resumed in the future. Currently, the stalled negotiations on the 
association agreement are costly for Syria to the extent that they prevent an international 
realignment of the government in the economic sphere. 
Last but not least, Syria which has been a founding member of GATT but withdrew one year 
later for political reasons, has applied to WTO accession in 2005. So far no working group 
has been established and the process is stalled. However, changes in legislation will be 
introduced in order to conform to the necessary framework and recently several committees to 
prepare the accession have been established (Interview 11). 
Apart from trade liberalisation, foreign direct investment is now possible in all sectors of the 
economy – agriculture, manufacturing, textiles, pharmaceuticals, ICT and programming, 
which creates a more conducive environment for much needed capital to flow into the country 
and breaks the previous monopoly of state owned enterprises in these sectors. Indeed, the 
registration of new companies has increased in the past three years (Interview 6) and the 
private sector is currently contributing more than 80 % to non-oil GDP. 
Despite these advances, a real „take-off” does not seem to have materialised (IMF 2007a). 
The World Bank attributes this to the major challenges that Syria’s three main productive 
sectors face: the oil sector is declining due to dwindling reserves; the agricultural sector faces 
constraints first due to the limited availability of water and second due to its reliance on 
subsidies, which have distorted its production structure; and lastly, the industrial sector faces 
major gaps in competitiveness due to low productivity and competition from trade 
liberalisation (World Bank 2005). This is reflected in the dominance of agricultural and 
energy exports which exhibit little value added. Overall, Syrian exports apart from a few 
niche products such as olive oil (Interview 11) face difficulties to compete in global markets. 
Thus, especially the EU association agreement is feared to have negative impacts at least in 
the short term, if not permanently, when local producers are exposed to competition from 
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abroad (Interview 5) Nevertheless, overall most interviewees perceive these free trade 
agreements to provide incentives to private sector development by locking the Syrian 
government into a market-oriented reform process. 
Given the above, it is necessary to identify the underlying barriers that hinder the 
development and competitiveness of Syria’s private sector. Our interviews revealed that, 
although the government has moved towards opening the economy for both domestic and 
foreign private investors, major obstacles to private sector development prevail. These 
include: 
1.  Non-tariff barriers; 
2.  high and unpredictable costs of „doing business”; 
3.  weak human capital; 
4.  weak financial markets; 
5.  an underdeveloped technological and physical infrastructure; and 
6.  the protection of state owned enterprises. 
3.2.2  Non-tariff barriers in trade 
While great strides have been made towards liberalising international trade, a recent 
evaluation identifies a number of non-tariff barriers that firms dealing with Syria face 
(European Union 2007). These non-tariff barriers include certain import restrictions still 
prevalent, even though the number of restricted items has been substantially reduced. 
Consular fees are levied as percentage of the contract value rather than at a fixed fee. The 
Arab League Boycott in which Syria participates prohibits companies to import goods or raw 
materials originating from Israel. Most importantly, in general, there is an overall lack of 
transparency and available information on rules and regulations and even though 
improvements on most of these issues have been taken de jure at least EU companies report 
that amendments in trade rules are not implemented de facto. Significantly, neither the issue 
of non-tariff barriers nor the limited implementation of new policies was discussed or 
mentioned in any of the interviews. Even after probing for existence of non-tariff barriers, the 
answer referred back to the reduction of tariffs and restricted goods. Without further 
information it is difficult to judge the reasons for the silence on these issues, thus, at this point 
it can only be noted that trade liberalisation appears to be incomplete and the outstanding 
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barriers are unlikely to form part of an overall economic strategy but appear to be due rather 
to significant institutional shortcomings. 
3.2.3  Costs of „doing business” 
One of the main consequences of the above mentioned non-tariff barriers are significant costs 
of „doing business” which create disincentives for the private sector. Yet, non-tariff barriers 
are not the only factor to inflate the costs of doing business: an opaque tax system, 
bureaucratic discretion, corruption, and an outdated legal framework for contracts, property 
rights and ownership contribute to (transaction) costs, uncertainty and risks that deter 
investment (Noland and Pack 2007; World Bank 2005; Interview 41). 
Although the Syrian government has placed great emphasis on improving its tax system by 
reducing tax rates and widening its tax base, the tax administration is still not functioning well 
due to institutional barriers and human capacity constraints. As one survey shows, a major 
factor is the number of informal payments demanded by tax administrators (World Bank 
2005) which increase the de facto tax rate above the officially stated rates. Coupled with 
bureaucratic discretion these uncertainties and costs significantly stifle business development. 
Further uncertainties are added due to an incomplete legal framework and due to the weak 
implementation of existing or new laws, particularly with respect to contracts, collateral and 
ownership. 
Even though the 10
th FYP recognises the need to enhance the legal framework and its 
implementation it seems that currently little emphasis is placed on removing administrative 
barriers, fully adapting the legislative framework to suit a market economy and to strengthen 
the rule of law. Legislation and the rule of law do not appear to feature greatly on the reform 
agenda not least reflected in the scarce mentioning it received in our interviews with Syrian 
government officials. This is not only seen as a critical issue by foreign eyes but also by some 
individuals within Syria. In fact, one interviewee contents that no actual reform has happened 
since the reform process has fallen short of addressing the above topics (Interview 7). Yet, 
even if the problem is recognised by a few, it appears to remain distant from the policy 
agenda. 
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3.2.4  Skills and labour markets 
Weak factor markets, which include labour as well as financial markets, create a third 
significant barrier to business development in Syria. The low productivity of Syrian 
businesses and the resulting lack of competitiveness are recognised not only by the World 
Bank (2005) but also across the interviews as well as Syria’s 10
th FYP. This low productivity 
is attributed to socio-economic and technological factors, the first referring to an 
insufficiently skilled labour force and the second to an insufficient technological base, which 
will be discussed further below. Syrian workers have on average a lower level of education 
than in many other countries (World Bank 2005) which is one of the main factors attributed to 
the deterioration of labour productivity (10
th FYP, Chapter, 2:6). In contrast, wages are 
relatively high (World Bank 2005) not least due to the high expectations that public sector 
employment sets. Given substantial benefits that public sector employment provides and 
certain distrust towards the private sector, most graduates seek employment in the first, 
leading to bottlenecks for the private sector. As mentioned above, unit labour productivity has 
been declining at an average rate of -1% in the period of 1997-2002 (ERF 2006: 9). Low 
labour productivity as well as rigidities and bottlenecks in the labour market have been 
recognised as key constraints in our interviews, yet, so far there does not seem to be a 
coherent strategy to improve the flexibility of labour markets and the level of training of the 
workforce. Most projects to enhance skills appear to be targeted at graduates and university 
students, i.e. focus on the already higher qualified rather than attempting to enhance the 
overall education and skills level of the workforce (for example Interview 42). In other words, 
policies focus strongly on short-term gains rather than on long-term structural changes. 
3.2.5 Financial  markets 
Apart from labour markets, financial markets are so far not sufficiently developed and the 
country is financially repressed (Glain 2004). The Syrian financial sector consists of the 
Central Bank of Syria (CB), six specialised public banks, six private banks, the Syrian 
Insurance Company and the Public Debt Fund. Further, the Damascus Stock Exchange is 
expected to re-open after 40 years of closure (IMF 2007a). Especially the development of the 
private banking sector is considered to have led to financial growth (IMF 2007a). Still the 
provision of efficient financial services is rather limited not least due to the small number of 
(foreign) banks and the absence of stock markets. Just as with foreign direct investment 
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(FDI), foreign ownership in the banking sector has been restricted to 49 %, which is not 
attractive to foreign banks, though there have been continued discussions surrounding the 
lifting of this limit to 60 % (Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 21). 
Apart from the insufficient range of financial services, technical obstacles slow down 
financial transactions. Syria is still a predominately cash based economy. Most importantly, 
however, insufficient information on the share of bad debts in the overall portfolio of banks 
creates uncertainty about the vulnerability of the financial system (Interview 23). To avoid the 
accumulation of bad debts and prevent a potential financial crisis the regulatory framework 
will have to be strengthened. The interviews showed that the Syrian government is aware of 
the limitations in the financial system and the need to introduce especially tighter regulation 
and supervision of banks by the Central Bank. However, and in line with the lack of 
commitment to privatisation, the closing of the soft budget constraints in the state-controlled 
will be the lackmus test of the financial market liberalisation. 
3.2.6 Infrastructure 
A further barrier to private sector development is the lack of a sufficiently developed physical 
infrastructure, including not only transport and port facilities but also telecommunications, 
power and water supply. According to a World Bank report „electric power supply was the 
third most commonly identified constraint for surveyed Syrian firms” (World Bank 2005: 
xiii). In information and communication technology, Syria ranks last in the region for its rate 
of internet connectivity and 7
th (out of 9) for its mobile phone density (World Bank 2005: 
xiii). Syrian representatives are well aware of the lack of infrastructure which has been cited 
as a problem in various interviews and which may prevent Syria from exploiting its potential 
as a regional trading centre and transport hub. The 10
th FYP recognises the role of the state to 
overcome this problem and is planning to allocate savings from phased out subsidies towards 
infrastructure development (Interview 30). According to a more recent interview the Syrian 
government is planning to invest approximately US Dollar 25 billion into infrastructure 
development and has opened the previously state monopolised infrastructure and transport 
sector to private investors (Syria Today 2007). 
Apart from physical infrastructure, a factor that seems to be entirely neglected in the Syrian 
reform process is research and development, i.e. „technological infrastructure”, to create and 
maintain competitive advantages not only through product innovations but also through 
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improved production processes. In the experience of the NICs technological innovation has 
been identified as key factor to secure a place in international global value chains (Lall 2001). 
Yet, the protection of Syrian businesses from competition stalls private sector innovation. In 
addition, there appears to be a lack of experts to drive research and development. For 
example, Syria appears to develop a significant pharmaceutical industry, which would require 
strong skills to be expanded further (Interview 39). Our interviews revealed that the 
government is placing too large an emphasis on developing business, economic and 
managerial skills neglecting that an innovative economy also requires scientists and engineers 
for innovation (part from the human capital needs of the state itself). Foreign direct 
investment plays a critical role for technological learning, while at the same time a certain 
level of technological capabilities is prerequisite to attract foreign direct investment. 
Worryingly, neither our interview partners nor the 10
th FYP seem to place much emphasis on 
the creation of technological learning. 
3.2.7  State owned enterprises 
The focus of the government on state owned enterprises maintains a disadvantage for private 
investments. Even if public sector monopolies have been relaxed across sectors, the subsidies 
to inefficient state owned enterprises creates unfair competition against the private sector. As 
mentioned above, the restructuring of state owned enterprises seems to be driven mostly by 
considerations of job security and political convenience. Consequently, the necessary 
restructuring and privatisation of state owned enterprises remains an extreme political taboo. 
3.2.8 Refugees 
A seriously neglected topic in the reform programme and in general government 
programming is the situation of the Iraqi refugees. This seems, in part, due to the unrealistic 
expectation that the influx of refugees from Iraq is a temporary phenomenon. Given the 
regional politics, however, this is highly unlikely. Either way, data on the number of refugees 
and their livelihoods is practically non-existent. According to the IMF (2007a), the number of 
refugees grew by 40 % in 2006 to about 1.3 million (7 % of Syrian population). Out of these, 
less than 80,000 had registered at UNHCR by 1 May 2007 (UNHCR 2007). 
Refugees from Iraq seem to have settled mainly in urban areas. As a consequence, rental and 
real estate prices have risen dramatically, inducing inflationary pressures. They also put a 
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high pressure on the governmental budget in view of energy and food subsidies, social 
spending and infrastructure. Paradoxically, there appears to be no supply-side response to this 
high demand for housing, at least in downtown Damascus (as opposed to informal 
construction activities in the suburbs). The refugees also boosted domestic demand and are 
thus perceived as the main driver for the Syrian economy in the last two years. This holds 
especially for the first wave of relatively wealthy refugees. Two issues remain crucial: 
1.  The Syrian government must prepare for the likely scenario, i.e. that the Iraqi refugees 
continue to stay in Syria indefinitely. 
2.  The Syrian government should receive greater international help in tackling the 
adverse effects in order to prevent further instability in the region, perhaps as part of a 
regional strategy on refugees and reconstruction. 
Apart from their impact on the economy, the high number of refugees from Iraq was seen by 
several interview partners as having the potential to lead to a rise of religious tensions in 
Syria, which currently is less problematic than in almost all neighbouring countries. Having 
said that, many of our interview partners perceived the political development in Syria’s 
neighbouring countries – especially in Iraq and Lebanon – as greater threats. 
3.2.9 Assessment 
The success of the Syrian reform programme rests crucially on a swift switch from oil-based 
state consumption to creating wealth in the private sector. Generating such a private sector 
supply response hinges on several key policy issues, which were identified above. This suite 
of systemic, institutional and capacity barriers will not be addressed by mere liberalisation on 
its own. In fact, as experiences from previous countries show liberalisation, especially capital 
account liberalisation, without having addressed these structural problems, could lead to 
serious negative repercussions either if domestic enterprises wither in international 
competition or if macro-economic instabilities lead to large scale capital outflows. Yet, apart 
from the hard issue of competitiveness of Syrian private sector production and the lack of 
physical infrastructure, soft barriers due to governance, rule of law, and technological 
capabilities do not seem to attract much attention of Syrian reformers. Especially skills and 
technological competitiveness become even more important factors as the global market place 
has changed rapidly with the emergence of global value chains that are starting to dominate 
  23DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt 35 
3 The Reform Agenda in Syria 
previously simple agricultural production processes even in the least developed countries of 
Africa (Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003). 
While the examples of the NICs is illustrative about the importance of institutions, 
technological capabilities and macro-economic stability as being key drivers for economic 
growth. However, the case of the NICs cannot provide lessons of how to attain these 
prerequisites as these are strongly contextual and path-dependent, i.e. have evolved over 
history rather than being simply instituted. Furthermore, globalisation requires a more 
stringent adherence to certain reforms than was the case for the NICs in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Consequently, Syrian reformers should, on the one hand, take a closer look at the success 
story of the NICs but, on the other hand, critically assess the present requirements of the 
international as well as the domestic economy before identifying its own reform strategy. In 
particular, comparisons to China and other South-East Asian tiger economies is probably on 
balance not helpful for finding Syria’s own development path given the differences in starting 
conditions and circumstances between these countries and periods. 
3.3  Poverty and Social Protection 
3.3.1 Poverty  trends 
During the last decade, poverty decreased in Syria. Using a (lower) household-specific 
poverty line reflecting the essential food and non-food requirements, 11.4 % of the population 
(2.2 million persons) was found poor in 2004. (Note that all figures in this section are taken 
from Laithy and Abu-Ismail (2005).) However, based on an upper poverty line taking into 
account actual consumption patterns of the poor, 30.1 % (almost 5.5 million persons) are 
considered poor. Similarly to the head count ratio, the poverty gap and the poverty severity 
indices declined (indicating that a typical poor person became less poor in that period). 
Poverty in Syria is comparatively shallow, i.e. the majority of the poor is clustered just below 
the poverty line. Small changes in growth thus have relatively strong effects – positive as 
negative – on the number of poor. This high elasticity of poverty to growth is, once again, less 
pronounced in the rural North-Eastern and the Coastal region where poverty is relatively 
deeper. However, there are rural-urban and – even more severe – regional disparities. As can 
be learned from Figure 2, poverty is the highest in the rural North-Eastern region and has 
increased there and in the rural Coastal region over the period 1997 – 2004. 
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Figure 2:  
Poverty Incidence by Region in 1996-1997 and 2003-2004 
 
Source: Laithy and Abu-Ismail (2005: 36). 
 
Looking at the characteristics of the poor, education has the strongest correlation with the 
incidence of poverty: 81.3 % of the poor have only a primary level of education or no 
education at all. Consequently, they are more likely to be engaged in the informal sector – 
particularly in agricultural and construction activities – with a high percentage of self-
employment. Given the apparent low degree of construction in the city centre of Damascus 
observed during our fieldwork (despite the refugee influx apparently pushing up rents), there 
appear to be large dividends for pro-poor growth to be harvested from relaxing legal or other 
supply constraints in the construction sector. 
3.3.2  Social protection policies 
The importance of enhancing human development has been acknowledged by the Syrian 
government. More specifically, it ratified the Millennium Development Goals and centred the 
10
th FYP (2006-2010) on human development whereby an active role of the private sector and 
civil society is envisaged. In addition to policies increasing education levels and creating 
employment opportunities, a core initiative is the planned establishment of a nation-wide 
social security net, the so-called Social Welfare Fund (SWF) (Government of the Syrian Arab 
Republic et al. 2007). The purpose of the programme is to substitute the present, 
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unsustainable energy and food subsidy system. The SWF is going to provide a subgroup of 
those below the poverty line, namely those who are not able to work (the so-called 
„vulnerable ultra poor”), aged persons, widowed, divorced and separated women, orphans up 
to 15 years of age, disabled persons and families of prisoners, with cash assistance. After a 
pilot phase in 2007, the program is to be implemented early 2008 under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MoSAL) (Government of the Syrian Arab Republic et 
al. 2007). In addition, a program is planned by UNDP and MoSAL to strengthen women 
empowerment in order to mitigate gender inequity outlined in the Initiation Plan for Poverty 
Alleviation and Women Empowerment in Syria published by the government. It remains to be 
seen, though, which steps the Government will undertake in the next months, including the 
time frame for scaling down the subsidies. In the worst scenario from a fiscal and social 
welfare point of view, old subsidies are not (yet) phased out while new subsidies will be 
introduced but will not be well targeted. 
Apart from better targeting and supporting the already poor, the government will need to 
institute measures especially in its legislation and regulatory framework to ensure to meet the 
criteria of a social market economy. This implies revising the legislative system to adapt the 
current organisation of social security to the new structure of the economy. While the poor are 
covered under the Social Welfare Fund mentioned above, an additional framework has to be 
instituted to cover employees. In this respect, a private approach to individual insurance 
should be encouraged and the private sector being made responsible without placing 
unnecessary burdens which will impact negatively on competitiveness. 
3.3.3  Data sources and analytical capacities 
One major obstacle the Syrian Government and international organizations currently face is 
the lack of good data on welfare and coping strategies of all residents in Syria, particularly at 
the household level. While some cross-sectional data exist, there is not yet a panel of 
households – that is repeated observations across years for a representative sample of 
households – which would allow much more interesting and powerful analyses. Moreover, if 
micro data are available, Syria currently lacks the capacity – with respect to both researchers 
and facilities – to analyze them in-depth. Hence, under the present circumstances, simulations 
of the potential impact of alternative policy measures can barely be conducted. Finally, the 
sparse analytical capacities that exist in this area in Syria are insufficiently connected across 
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different branches of government. Likewise, donors do not appear yet to view poverty 
reduction as an overarching or cross-cutting theme driving assistance strategies. (Interview 1; 
Interview 41; Interview 43). 
3.3.4 Assessment 
The importance to support poverty alleviation becomes even more urgent in times of 
stabilisation and structural reform which involve a severe change in relative prices, and thus a 
redistribution of incomes especially of the poor through cuts in welfare systems and subsidies. 
One key lesson to be drawn especially from structural adjustment programmes that were 
implemented in LDCs in the 1980s is that poverty reduction and wealth creation should not be 
handled as an added issue but form integral part of any structural reforms themselves (Cornia 
et al. 1987) 
For example, given that the agricultural sector absorbs a large number of disguised 
unemployed, strengthening the supply response of the agricultural sector could serve the 
double function to enhance the diversification of the economy on the one hand and embark on 
pro poor growth on the other. Thus, rather than establishing a system of unemployment 
benefits, support should focus on farmers and informal micro-entrepreneurs directly for 
example through establishing a system of appropriate micro-finance schemes. So far 
microfinance has currently not a very big volume. There is cooperation between the KfW and 
the Syrian Bank (Interview 4; Interview 5). Further, law 15 introduces banks for micro 
credits, which in contrast to the KfW and Aga Khan foundation provide credits at lower, 
presumably subsidized, interest rates (Interview 18). A concern is that micro finance 
programmes should not provide a pretext for the introduction or continuation of further 
subsidies. 
Although the challenges of poverty and employment (including self-employment) are of 
utmost urgency especially in the light of the influx of refugees as well as stabilisation and 
structural reform measures, poverty and employment are not yet key concerns of most 
analysts outside of the inner reform circle. This stands in striking contrast to the general 
concern about low real wages and potentially declining subsidies. The lack of systematic 
knowledge of the extent of the social situation of the various resident groups in society 
(including Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish refugees) could be one reason for this phenomenon, 
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the solution of which should receive urgent attention (see also the section below on internal 
constraints). 
Last but not least, planning for the continued presence of Iraqis in Syria should be a top policy 
priority and should be mainstreamed in policy processes including housing, health, education, 
etc. Considering the circumstances in Iraq, it is more than likely that the Iraqis are going to 
remain in Syria for a long period of time. Depending on the developments in the neighbouring 
country, even more people may come. While the government recognises the urgency with 
which it needs to address this problem it importantly further acknowledges that Iraqis in Syria 
do not only place a burden but could also provide economic opportunities, not least by 
expanding the domestic market. Yet, more explicit strategies, which are also feasible from a 
political economy perspective, how to integrate Iraqis in Syria productively into the economy 
without competing with Syrian businesses and reducing the financial drain that they might 
incur should be developed. 
4  Evaluating the Reform Process 
The above section has provided a brief overview of the Syrian government’s progress towards 
implementing its reform programme, pointed towards obstacles and gaps in the process and 
provided a brief evaluation about prospective actions of the Syrian reformers. At the same 
time, the above section has shown that some obstacles and barriers to the reform process are 
related less to the reform programme but rather to the reform process itself and to the context 
in which Syrian reforms are being implemented. The statement of one of the interviewees 
summarises the situation succinctly: the reform programme of the 10
th FYP has been a 
breakthrough, but it may be a little bit overambitious, considering the level of skills and the 
problem that people may resist reform (Interview 35). In fact, as the experiences of LDCs, 
Eastern Europe, and the NICs have shown, it is not just the contents of reforms but a suite of 
contextual factors that determine the success of the reform programme (Lall 2001; World 
Bank 1993). 
Based on these experiences and our interviews conducted in Syria, three critical factors 
emanate: 
1.  the capacity and knowledge of the civil service and their ability to monitor and 
manage the process; 
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2.  the credibility of the reforms which is vital to instil confidence of domestic and 
foreign private sector into the economy; and 
3.  the internal and external political economy. 
4.1  Capacity, Knowledge and Evaluation 
There are at least two factors that determine the capabilities of policy makers to manage the 
economic reform process: 
1.  the skills and technical capacity of policy makers; and 
2.  the available information, i.e. data, to monitor the reform process and make informed 
decisions. 
4.1.1 Skills  and  technical capacities of reformers 
The importance of technical capacity of reformers should not be underestimated. While 
especially the IMF and the World Bank like to describe stabilisation and adjustment as a 
simple, well delineated two step process, in reality both types of reforms are highly complex. 
This was shown already in the stabilisation and structural adjustment processes of the 1980s 
(Killick and Stevens 1991). The changing role of the state in an environment of market 
failures requires a high degree of understanding of the underlying economic processes. The 
successful interventions of the state in the NICs were only possible due to their high 
competency (World Bank 1993). 
In the case of Syria, there is a small number of highly qualified and well trained high level 
policy makers who are well equipped to plan and guide the reform process; yet there is some 
need for more capacity in this area. The main problem appears to lie at the level of policy 
implementation where mid-level civil servants lack the necessary skills and motivation to 
implement the reforms (Interview 14; Interview 15). The Syrian government is well aware of 
these insufficient skills. In fact, the related lack of implementation of agreed reforms has been 
partly attributed to this lack of sufficient human resources (Interview 6). The National 
Institute of Public Administration, which was established in 2002, trains qualified civil 
servants by providing courses in economics, management and foreign languages (Interview 
14; Interview 15). However, the deeper problems remain to be the low quality of schools and 
universities, the low degree of international exchange and return migration as well as the low 
  29DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt 35 
4 Evaluating the Reform Process 
FDI and the skill transfer these would entail (Interview 42). To bridge skills gaps in the short 
run, the government is seeking support from international experts through close cooperation 
with e.g. the World Bank, the IMF, the European Union and the GTZ. 
4.1.2 Collection  and  dissemination of information 
These remedial actions will not succeed if better qualified staff do not have the necessary 
information to work with. Apart from insufficient domestic skills, the absence of systematic 
information and data to monitor the reform process in particular and trends in the Syrian 
economy in general hinders informed decision making. Again, this problem is not unknown to 
Syrian policy makers as complaints about lack of data in various interviews showed. 
Apart from the general lack of data, three priority areas were identified which require more 
information: 
1.  Economic statistics on private sector activity. So far economic statistics are mostly 
available on the public sector, while hardly any information exists about private sector 
activity. 
2.  Panel household data as argued above. 
3.  Data on the status, coping strategies and welfare of the Iraqi refugees in Syria is not 
available as they are currently not covered in any household survey. 
As the reform process is still quite young, the introduction of an adequate monitoring and 
evaluation system is even more worthwhile. Furthermore, rigorously evaluating the impact of 
policy measures will have save scarce resources and accelerate the delivery of welfare and 
output enhancing policies to the entire population, thus raising the political acceptance of the 
economic reform programme. 
So far no steps appear to have been instituted to establish a coherent data collection and 
policy monitoring system. Such task could involve the State Planning Commission (SPC), 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and a reformed National Planning Institute (NPI). The NPI 
in particular should be tasked to provide analysis and policy advice and to be a forum for 
domestic economic policy debates. It should be independent from government and donors and 
have a clear long term mandate and perspective to ensure the meaningful long term 
monitoring of reform processes. This centre should provide training at Western master-level, 
as an entry into Western PhD programmes, and have a strong visitors programme to foster the 
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international transfer of skills and technologies. This centre could be modelled after the 
National Agricultural Policy Centre (NAPC), which fulfils some of these conditions for the 
fields of agriculture, rural development, poverty alleviation, and international trade in an 
admirable way. 
Last but not least, capacity also refers to the financial ability to pay for the stabilisation and 
reform process but especially to pay for supplementary activities which will help to reduce the 
short to medium costs of reform. Even though a range of donors have been involved in 
various aspects of the reform process, the overall role of donors is not clearly spelt out and 
coordinated, neither with respect to financial nor technical support. On the one hand, external 
support could not only ease the financial burden of the reform but could also ensure a 
smoother reform process which is informed by the lessons and experiences that other 
countries provide. On the other hand, experiences with previous stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes have shown that the involvement of donors is not necessarily unproblematic. The 
value of financial assistance can be undermined by contradictory policies of donor countries 
(Killick and Stevens 1991) especially in cases where they pursue objectives which are not 
aligned with objectives of the recipient country. Nevertheless, given the need to buffer 
negative repercussions of the poor, to decrease the burden on interest groups that could 
potentially stall the full implementation of the programmes, to gain credibility and to signal 
commitment the Syrian government should seriously consider a more strategic involvement 
of foreign donors in the planning and implementation of its economic reform process. 
4.2  Credibility of the Reforms 
As the above analysis has shown, liberalised markets although necessary are not sufficient to 
trigger the desired private sector response. Additional factors such as connectivity to the 
world market through transport and information infrastructure, labour productivity and 
technological capabilities play a critical role. Given their public good nature, these factors 
warrant a certain degree of state intervention to overcome coordination failures in investment. 
Apart from these „technical” components, lessons from previous stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programmes in developing countries show that confidence in the sustainability of 
the reform process in the long run may be a „more important desideratum in this process” 
(Rodrik 1990: 933f). Investors require certainty that reforms will not be reversed in the 
medium to long run. Especially in the context of an economy in transition, which does not 
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have a proven track record of stable macro-economic variables, the credibility of the reform 
process constitutes an even more important indicator for future economic stability (Rodrik 
1990). 
In this respect, political statements such as the President’s explicit commitment to the reform 
process in his speech to the Ba’ath party that was pointed out as symbol of commitment by 
the Deputy Prime Minister al-Dardari are necessary but not sufficient to demonstrate 
commitment (Interview 6). In Syrian eyes this commitment may weigh significantly given 
that the president usually does not voice his opinion on these issues (Interview 6), yet to 
outsiders unfamiliar with Syrian political traditions and concerned with impacts rather than 
political statements a verbal commitment may lack weight. What counts for investors and 
economic agents are impacts, which are difficult to assess due to the lack of strategic data 
collection, evaluation and information dissemination that could demonstrate progress 
factually. As already mentioned above, establishing a sound monitoring and evaluation 
framework through appropriate legislation should be an utmost priority on the one hand to be 
able to demonstrate observers of the credibility of the reforms and on the other to enable 
reformers to identify strengths and weaknesses and adjust policies accordingly. The 
implementation of the reforms then requires the right personnel, appropriate administrative 
processes, sound data on the status quo and the impact of reforms and processes to adjust 
policies if necessary. 
The perceptions on the reform process vary because different agents use different points of 
references to evaluate the reform process, which in turn is related to the absence of strategic 
data collection and dissemination. Although recognising that there are still challenges, the 
latest IMF report is overall very optimistic about the Syrian government’s commitment to the 
reform process (IMF 2007a). Similarly, the World Bank appears to acknowledge that, even 
though the process has been piecemeal, it has been continuous and determined (Interview 28). 
In contrast, other interview partners argued that the still apparent gaps in the reforms which 
have been spelt out above signal a lack in commitment. Yet, it is questionable whether speed 
of reform or the degree of implementation is actually a good indicator for reform 
sustainability given that the reform programme is still in its early phase. Especially those 
reforms which may cause negative economic impacts such as the phasing out of subsidies 
warrant a more gradual approach in order to ensure commitment across all levels. A „big 
bang” approach that jeopardises internal stability could undermine credibility more rather 
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than a gradual approach would. Nevertheless, it appears necessary to enhance the 
transparency of the reform programme both domestically as well as internationally. 
Importantly, this should also help to overcome the prevailing sense of a „boycott economy” 
(i.e. an economy that should be self-sufficient even under strong external pressure) that is still 
too apparent to external observers. 
Another factor that undermines the credibility of the Syrian reform process is the isolated 
approach within which economic reforms are being implemented. Apart from stabilising and 
transforming an economy, credibility of a reform process requires enhancing transparency and 
the rule of law, as was discussed above. Yet, institutional and systemic reform which 
transforms the role of the state from an active participant in the economy into a provider of 
security to investment and future returns is not visibly incorporated in the reform process. 
Critique about this omission is not only levelled by foreign consultants and experts but also 
by some Syrians (Interview 5; Interview 7). Although improving governance is explicitly 
mentioned in the 10
th FYP, this appears to be more related to enhanced administration than 
political rule. Further, issues of governance were hardly acknowledged across the interviews, 
suggesting that the economic reform process was chosen to be narrow and technocratic in its 
approach. 
A sustainable policy environment does not only constitute stable macro-economic policies, a 
credible set of microeconomic incentives but also the absence of political shocks that might 
trigger a reversal in the reform process (Rodrick 1990). Political instability that may lead to 
disruptions of economic activity and thus threatens returns on investment in a given country 
or region are just as important factors determining the decision making of foreign and 
domestic investors. Especially a country considered to be an aggressor by some parties is 
unlikely to be given confidence, due to the risk that economic growth and property rights of 
individual investors will be valued less than geo-political objectives of the country at large. 
4.3  The Internal and External Political Context 
Internal and external political dynamics are important determinants of reform processes. In 
the case of Syria two factors play a decisive role in determining the success of Syria’s reform 
programme: external boycotts of moves towards liberalisation and internal resistance against 
reform. 
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With respect to the first, Syria looses benefits of its economic liberalisation due to several 
unresolved foreign policy issues, including the Golan Heights, its role in Lebanon and the 
international sanctions applied by the United States, which prohibit companies from investing 
in Syria. A further obstacle is the delay in the agreement of an EU association agreement by 
the European Parliament and by some member states. As Deputy Prime Minister al-Dardari 
recognised in a recent interview, these sanctions place severe restrictions on the possibility of 
attracting foreign direct investment especially from US companies with negative 
repercussions especially on the energy as well as the IT sector. Important in this respect, these 
sanctions imply not only lost capital but also missed opportunities for technological transfer 
and skills development which Syria urgently requires (Syria Today July 2007). It is beyond 
the scope of this report to argue about the justification of these sanctions or to discuss Syria’s 
geo-political stance in the Middle East. Still, reformers have to consider – and as the 
interview with al-Dardari shows, seem to be aware – that foreign relations and policies do 
influence economic decision making, especially the decision making of foreign investors. 
Probably more significant, internal political dynamics play a critical role for the sustainability 
of the reform process. As has been mentioned throughout the report, both stabilisation 
measures and structural reform with the consequent liberalisation of markets, institutional 
restructuring and legislative changes induce not only a redistribution of economic resources 
but also transform power relations and hierarchies across all levels. Especially political and 
economic „losers” may attempt to stall the reform process, leading „at best” to incomplete 
implementation and at worst to the destabilisation of the existing political system if not 
complete overthrow of the ruling elite in power. As previous experiences especially in Latin 
America have shown, a government whether democratically elected or authoritarian that lacks 
legitimacy is unlikely to be able to sustain reforms which are unfavourable with the public or 
influential power elites, such as the military (Killick and Stevens 1991). Estimating the 
potential for political resistance against the Syrian reform process requires a much more in-
depth analysis how reforms will impact on power relations and different interest groups which 
surpasses the scope of this report. Nevertheless, arguments and statements made in the 
interviews show that internal political factors and the fear of a negative political backlash are 
critical determinants of the reform process. In this sense, interviews identified mid-level civil 
servants as well as the powerful economic elite or even small groups of urban consumers as 
actors who could play a role in stalling the reform (Interview 14; Interview 15; Interview 6). 
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It has been argued that due to these forces old entities and institutions have actually not been 
abolished but rather a parallel system has been created (Interview 28). 
Economic reform cannot be successfully implemented in isolation from politics as the 
stability of an economic system, and the confidence into it, is not only determined by 
economic but also by political factors. Previous stabilisation and adjustment programmes in 
other countries have often overlooked these political factors, especially to restore confidence 
of the private sector. Our interview partners suggested that the Syrian government’s main 
strategy to overcome internal resistance against reforms is to slow down the pace of reforms. 
However, the question remains whether this is sufficient to buy-in actual support or whether 
additional measures should be employed. Increased transparency and information 
dissemination about reform plans, their impacts and ways to mitigate the costs could be an 
important signal to the public (Interview 21). In short, it may be necessary to pursue a more 
open reform rhetoric to achieve the aims of the reforms. 
5 Conclusions  and  Recommendations 
In conclusion, while the progress of the Syrian reform process has been commended 
especially by the International Financial institutions (IMF and World Bank), much remains to 
be done to overcome the three challenges that Syria’s economy faces: to achieve the shift 
from an oil-exporting economy towards a net oil importer; to manage the transition from a 
socialist planned economy towards a liberalised social market economy; and to reduce 
poverty and enhance human development through targeted interventions which ensure a more 
equitable redistribution of wealth and equal economic opportunities for wealth creation across 
all segments of the Syrian society. 
As Section 3 has shown, Syria has made great strides towards implementing reform. 
Nevertheless, key problems remain in the process of stabilisation and structural reform. 
Regarding the first, explicit and implicit subsidies and an oversized and inefficient public 
sector continue to drain the public budget. At the same time, given declining oil revenues, 
public revenues have been and continue to dwindle as non-oil revenues from especially from 
taxation remains small. 
With respect to structural reform, several key barriers hinder an adequate private sector 
supply response that could replace the role of the state in the economy. First and foremost, 
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state owned enterprises still enjoy government protection through soft-budget constraints. At 
the same time, the private sector faces stiff non-tariff barriers to trade, high costs of „doing 
business” and an arbitrary system of law enforcement which create disincentives to doing 
business. Lack of a skilled labour force (leading to above mentioned low productivity), a 
shallow financial system and underdeveloped physical and technological infrastructure create 
further obstacles to successful private sector development. At the same time, the Syrian 
government looses potential private sector participants as the large stream of refugees is not 
fully integrated into the Syrian economy. 
Importantly, while most reports on the Syrian government’s reform process focus on these 
respective gaps, this report has attempted to provide an insight of the barriers that may hinder 
the Syrian government to proceed with its reforms. In this respect the most important 
obstacles appear to be: 
1.  The capacity of public sector and civil servants to implement the reforms; 
2.  the credibility of the economic reform programme and thus its ability to raise the 
necessary supply response both domestically and internationally; and 
3.  the external and internal political economy, that even if as such relatively stable is 
already hindering or slowing down the process of the reform programme. 
As the interviews have shown the Syrian government is partly aware of these factors yet, so 
far no sufficient strategies to overcome these barriers have been designed. Even though Syria 
is a relative latecomer regarding its reform programme, in contrast to the countries of Africa, 
Latin America and Eastern Europe who faced severe crisis situations when implementing 
their reform programmes Syria enjoys relative economic stability. The Syrian government 
should fully build on this advantage and use the available time to devise an integrated strategy 
addressing both these obstacles as well as the remaining measures necessary to complete the 
reform process. In this respect, the Syrian government should take full advantage of available 
financial and technical aid that is available to it. 
Building on the key findings derived from the interviews and the available literature, the 
report proposes following recommendations to the Syrian government. 
To address the challenge of macro-economic stabilisation, the government should focus on 
reducing the unsustainable budget deficit through: 
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•  Aiming to phase out subsidies fully (while in parallel building up a less costly and more 
effective social safety net to protect the poorest of the poor). The overall aim of the 
changes should be relief of the fiscal deficit and more effective poverty alleviation. 
•  Further limiting recruitment in the public sector. 
•  Focusing on enhancing the efficiency of non-oil revenue collection, especially through 
improving the current tax administration; yet without creating disincentives to the currently 
large informal sector to enter the formal economy. 
•  Allocating scarce public finances more effectively, i.e. into economically most productive 
sectors. 
To foster structural reform and the private sector supply response through: 
•  Exposing State owned enterprises to competition thus inducing efficient (financial) 
management by phasing out currently prevailing soft-budget constraints. 
•  Rather than training more entrepreneurs, creating a more conducive business environment 
for existing entrepreneurs by reducing „costs of doing business” especially through ending 
non-tariff barriers and strengthening the rule of law. 
•  Maximising the economic benefits that refugees can provide to the Syrian economy. 
To enhance the credibility and thus sustainability of the reform process through: 
•  Recognising that economic sustainability is determined by non-economic factors such as 
internal and external political stability and that the credibility of economic reforms cannot 
be detached from internal and external political processes. 
•  Embracing the involvement of donors in providing technical and financial capacity to 
support the reform process. 
In this respect, donors could support the Syrian through the following activities. 
To address the challenge of macro-economic stabilisation, donors could: 
•  Provide financial assistance and expertise in activities critical to the success of the reform 
process, which surpass the Syrian budget limitations (e.g. data collection). 
To foster structural reform and the private sector supply response through: 
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•  Supporting Syria’s regional and international economic integration e.g. by fostering 
bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements. 
•  Supporting the improvement of internal political constraints, specifically those relating to 
enforcement of the rule of law. 
•  Supporting human capital accumulation, importantly not with a short term focus on 
entrepreneurial training but rather through a comprehensive improvement of the quality 
and accessibility of education across all levels. 
•  Supporting the integration of refugees into economic processes. 
•  Building Syrian analytical capacity through supporting data collection (Panel and 
household data) and strengthening research institutes such as the National Planning 
Institute (NIP) to provide analysis and policy advice building on and extending model 
experiences such as the National Agricultural Policy Centre (NAPC). 
To enhance the credibility and thus sustainability of the reform process through: 
•  Supporting human capital development as mentioned above. 
•  Recognising the internal political difficulties to implement specific steps of the reform 
process and supporting the search for adequate solutions to overcome internal political 
constraints to the reform process. 
•  Supporting the resolution of external political constraints that jeopardise the sustainability 
and credibility of the reform process. 
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